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Preliminary Perspectives on Judicial Discretion 13 
SENTENC IN G: THE D I LE M MA OF D I S C RE T I ON 
By Jerold Israel 
Prqfessor of Law, The University of Michigan 
[The following excerpts are taken from Professor Jerold Israel's revision 
of the late Hazel B. Kerper's Introduction to the Criminal Justice System 
(West Publishing Co. 1979), with permission of the author and publisher. 
Footnotes have been omitted.] 
As we have seen, judges usually have substantial discretion in sentencing. 
Most states give them considerable leeway in choosing between probation 
and imprisonment, in setting the term of imprisonment under either an indeter­
minate or determinate sentencing structure, in deciding whether a young of­
fender will be given the special benefits of a youthful offender statute, and in 
determining whether to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences for multi­
ple convictions. 
In some jurisdictions, judges even have the final say as to whether an ex­
tended term will be imposed under a habitual offender charge. Judicial discre­
tion in sentencing is one of the most hotly debated subjects in the criminal jus­
tice field today. Few experts are satisfied with the present system, but there is a 
sharp division among critics as to what reforms are needed. Some argue that 
extensive judicial discretion is basically correct, but minor modifications would 
be valuable so as to more carefully control the exercise of that discretion. Oth­
ers argue that the discretion must be taken away from the judges and either 
placed elsewhere or largely eliminated from the sentencing process. 
To fully appreciate the issues in this crucial debate, one must have some an­
swers to at least three questions. Why did we give judges extensive sentencing 
discretion in the first place? What have been the advantages and disadvan­
tages of judicial discretion? What alternatives are available, and what are their 
advantages and disadvantages? After lengthy discussions, experts remain in 
disagreement as to the appropriate response to these questions. We will at­
tempt merely to summarize some of the more substantial points they have 
made. 
Individualizing Sentences: The Need for Discretion 
We note in Chapter Five that the movement toward indeterminate sentences 
(and judicial discretion) reflected an interest in accommodating the several ob­
jectives of punishment. Indeterminate sentencing was designed to achieve re­
habilitation as well as deterrence, to avoid needless incapacitation while still 
obtaining a punishment sufficient to serve the legitimate needs of retribution. 
The development of probation reflected these same concerns, although the 
primary emphasis here clearly was on rehabilitation. The overall objective of 
our sentencing philosophy was to make the punishment fit the offender as well 
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as the offense. This was an objective that required individualized sentencing 
based upon the facts of the individual case. It was an objective that lent itself 
naturally to broad judicial discretion. 
There are those today who contend that our emphasis on rehabilitation has 
been misplaced -- not because it is an inappropriate goal, but because it re­
mains largely beyond our capacity. Yet even if this controversial premise is ac­
cepted, the need for individualized sentencing hardly disappears. If one looks 
to incapacitation, deterrence, or even retribution, there is still need for individu­
alization. Let us consider, for example, five cases of kidnapping. No. 1 is a 
woman whose baby died, and who took another woman· s baby from the hos­
pital. No.2 is a young man whose girlfriend said she was breaking up with him. 
He put her in a car and drove her around for 24 hours trying to persuade her to 
change her mind, while her frantic parents tried to locate them and the girl did 
everything she could to get away. No. 3 is a divorced man who took his own 
child from its mother who had legal custody and refused to tell the mother 
where the child was. No. 4 is a kidnapper for ransom who kept a young woman 
buried in a box fitted with air tubes for breathing in order to make it impossible 
for searchers to find her, and who demanded $200,000 from her wealthy father. 
No. 5 is a woman accomplice of the kidnapper for ransom. She assisted in the 
kidnapping because she was in love with the kidnaper and was also threatened 
by him. She did everything she could to keep the kidnapped girl alive when it 
was possible for her to do so. 
The offense charged in each of our five cases is identical -- kidnapping. The 
legislature has drawn some general distinctions in defining that crime, but it 
can hardly take into consideration all of the factors that distinguish one kidnap­
ping from another and one person's participation from that of his accomplice. 
Even if one were concerned only with retribution, somebody must be given au­
thority to distinguish between these five cases. The evil in each is hardly equiva­
lent to the others even though the same crime is involved. A sanction as severe 
as imprisonment should not be imposed without drawing more careful lines 
that relate to our retribution objective. Of course, once we add consideration of 
deterrence and some degree of rehabilitation, we must consider more factors 
and there is even greater need for individualization. In sum, individualization 
probably would not be as essential if we had fewer punishment objectives and 
they did not so frequently clash, but even if we shifted our focus so that deter­
rence or retribution became the dominant theme-- as some say we should -­
a certain amount of individualization (and hence discretion) would still be need­
ed. 
Factors Affecting Judicial Discretion 
How in fact have judges utilized the discretion they have received? Have 
they emphasized factors that relate to the several goals of punishment? Most 
experts believe that they have done so, although many would say that there has 
been too much emphasis on one factor or another. While the weight given to 
Preliminary Perspectives on Judicial Discretion 15 
particular factors varies with the judge, almost all judges have tended to look to 
the same basic elements. The first, and probably the most significant, is the 
seriousness of the offense as it was carried out. As we saw in our five kidnap­
ping cases, the gravity of the actor's wrongdoing is not always revealed simply 
by the punishment category in which the legislature places the particular crime. 
A sentencing court will want to know if the case involved special aggravating 
circumstances that made the defendant's conduct more serious than that of 
other offenders who commit the same crime. Though a violent act is not a for­
mal element of the crime charged, did the defendant here actually threaten 
harm to his victim? Did he involve minors in the commission of the crime? Did 
he pick upon a victim who was particularly vulnerable? Did the planning, so­
phistication or professionalism of the crime indicate premeditation? On the 
other side, the court also will want to know if the case involved special mitigat­
ing factors that suggest a lower sentence: the defendant may have been a pas­
sive participant or may have played a minor role in committing the crime; the 
defendant may have exercised special caution to avoid harming the victim; the 
defendant may have acted under the influence of alcohol or extreme emotional 
stress; or the victim may have been an initiator or provoker of the incident. Our 
list of mitigating and aggravating factors is not complete, but only illustrative. 
As we have noted, several of the recently adopted determinate sentencing pro­
visions include lists of specific aggravating and mitigating factors to be consid­
ered by the judge. 
Judges also will look to the character and background of the defendant. Has 
he been convicted of previous offenses? Has he "served time" before? Has he 
engaged in a pattern of violent conduct which suggests that he poses a serious 
danger to society? What is his attitude towards this crime.:.._ has he pled guilty, 
made restitution to the victim, assisted the police in convicting his accom­
plices? Does he have a social stability indicating that he may be able to stay out 
of trouble? Relevant factors here include his family ties, employment record, 
possible addiction to drugs, and the character of his friends and associates. 
Many judges are concerned that such factors tend to discriminate among so­
cio-economic classes, favoring in particular the defendant from a middle­
class community. However, available evidence suggests that such offenders 
are less likely to repeat certain types of offenses (e.g., burglaries) than other 
prisoners who have far less to look forward to when they are returned to the 
community. 
Another factor likely to influence the judge is the community attitude toward 
the crime and the offender. If there is special community fear of the particular 
type of crime, or outrage as to the particular case before the court, the judge 
may feel that the community's demand for retribution or deterrence should be 
reflected in his sentence. Reviewing a sentence of two years imprisonment and 
five years suspended sentence for two counts of forcible rape, the Supreme 
Court of Alaska rejected that sentence because it failed to give sufficient weight 
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to "community condemnation of the offender's anti-social conduct." The trial 
court had relied primarily upon the defendant's potential for rehabilitation, but 
the Alaska Supreme Court stressed that the interest did not justify ignoring the 
need for "the reaffirmation of societal norms, for the purpose of maintaining re­
spect for the norms." In light of that need, the sentence was too lenient: "A sub­
stantially longer period of actual confinement was called for ... [so as to] bring 
home to [the defendant] the serious nature and consequences of his crime and 
to reaffirm society's condemnation of violent and forcible rape." 
The judge's exercise of discretion in sentencing also is likely to be in­
fluenced by his perspective of the state's corrections system. The nature of 
prison life and prison programs may be a deciding factor in choosing between 
probation or imprisonment or in setting the term of imprisonment. When there 
still is some hope for rehabilitation, and the judge views the prison system as 
almost inevitably having a negative impact on an offender, the judge is more 
likely to turn to probation. Where the judge has decided on imprisonment. the 
conditions under which time will be served may influence his determination as 
to the appropriate minimum term. Life in an antiquated, maximum security pris­
on obviously is somewhat different than life in a modern, minimum security in­
stitution. The judge may be impressed (or depressed) by the prison system's 
rehabilitative programs. Where he has some confidence in those programs, he 
may hesitate to impose a high minimum for fear that it will interfere with the pa­
role of the prisoner at that point when he is most likely to achieve a successful 
return to the community. Judges are aware that holding a prisoner beyond that 
point may be counterproductive. It can lead to bitterness and a reinforcement 
of the attitudes which led the offender to prison in the first place. On the other 
hand, if the judge believes that the corrections system offers little hope of reha­
bilitation or that the parole board takes too many unjustifiable risks, he may be 
inclined to impose a higher minimum sentence. 
Judges also take into consideration the impact of the sentence upon the ad­
ministration of an overburdened criminal justice system. They recognize that if 
concessions are not given for guilty pleas, the backlog of cases to be tried may 
grow so heavy as to almost cause the system to collapse. They also recognize 
that, where prisons are overcrowded and new prisons are not being built, the 
parole board may be in a position where it is forced to release a prisoner for 
every new prisoner it receives. In such situations, high maximum terms are 
meaningless. Prisoners will be released long before their full terms are served 
(even without consideration of liberal good time allowances). Indeed, a high 
minimum may be unwise even though the judge is confident that this offender 
should be incapacitated for a substantial period of time. The judge has no way 
of comparing this offender to others that the parole board also must consider 
for possible release. Assuming that overcrowding will require the parole board 
to release some prisoners who are far from good risks, the judge may hesitate 
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to tie the board· s hands with a high minimum. thereby possibly forcing it to take 
an even greater risk in paroling a less deserving prisoner. 
THE THE O RY OF DISC RETION IN THE 
FE DE R A L  RU LES OF EVI DENCE 
By Thomas M. Mangler 
Assistant Professor of Law. University of Illinois 
This is one of those issues. of which there are so many during a 
trial. where a judge is within legal boundaries no matter what he 
does. The authorities support a ruling for either side. 
Scott Turow. Presumed Innocent 
Few commentators have examined the theory of judicial discretion in the 
Federal Rules of Evidence and that theory's implications for the roles of trial and 
appellate courts. The few who have examined the issue claim that the Federal 
Rules' policy granting the trial court substantial flexibility is somehow tied to the 
overriding philosophy of the rules, which favors admitting all relevant evidence. 
Indeed, one commentator regards judicial discretion and broad admissibility 
as causally linked: "Three words describe the direction in which the Federal 
Rules of Evidence have taken us: discretion, creativity, and admissibility. The 
codes give abundant discretionary power to the trial courts. The judges add a 
sizable measure of interpretive creativity. Greater admissibility has resulted." 
Undoubtedly, the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence were guided in 
part by a policy favoring the admission of all relevant evidence. On its face. 
however, the linking of discretion and liberal admissibility seems misguided. 
Given a decent amount of flexibility, a trial judge may exclude--as easily as ad­
mit--evidence. 
Other reasons motivated the drafters to build flexibility into the Federal 
Rules. Their views on trial court discretion derive. not from any thoughts about 
admissibility, but from an awareness of limitations concerning trial judges, co­
dified rules of evidence. and the trial process itself. First. the drafters believed 
that evidence, arguably more than any other field of the law. calls for trial judges 
to make quick decisions. One consequence of ruling on the run is that evi­
dence law must be simple and accessible. Another consequence is that re­
gardless of the specificity or the generality of a particular rule, a trial judge, how­
ever knowledgeable and well-intentioned, will sometimes make the wrong call 
under the time pressure of an ongoing trial. 
Second. the drafters believed that the trial process itself and the traditional 
rules of evidence are imperfect tools in getting at the truth of a particular contro­
versy. Each trial tells its own tale, raises unique evidentiary concerns, and con­
sequently calls for individual treatment. All things considered. trial procedures. 
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including evidentiary rules, provide litigants with an acceptably fair means for 
resolving their dispute. But few believe--least of all the drafters of the Federal 
Rules--that detailed evidence rules can be devised which, if mechanically 
applied, would be appropriate for every controversy. 
Third, the drafters understood that evidence decisions frequently call for a 
delicate balancing ofthe probative value of an item of evidence against its pre­
judicial effect. Most, though certainly not all, rules of evidence are designed to 
limit the prejudicial effect of certain evidence in the minds of jurors or to prevent 
them from overvaluing it. But the rules accomplish these goals only imperfect­
ly; because of the stronger value favoring admissibility of relevant evidence, 
sometimes a great amount of prejudice is injected into a trial. Moreover, as­
sessing the possible prejudicial effect of evidence is often a difficult task. At 
best, this nebulous inquiry into the minds of a handful of lay people involves a 
great deal of guesswork. The drafters understood, therefore, that trial judges 
need some guidance here, but additionally require the flexibility to mitigate and 
apportion among the litigants the harmful effects of prejudicial evidence. 
Taken together, these considerations argue for an evidence code that 
strikes "a middle course between vague generalities and constricting particu­
larity." These are the words of Professor Edward W. Cleary, the Reporter to the 
Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence, and they describe well 
the style of those rules. This Article contends that the architects of this "middle 
course" intended to give some guidance, through specific rules, to trial courts 
and litigants so that the trial process would be sufficiently predictable. None­
theless, the drafters sought to provide enough play in the joints to permit the 
trial court to consider the cumulative effect of the close prejudice and reliability 
rulings and to split them fairly among the parties. In a civil trial, fair apportion­
ment may simply mean evenhanded treatment of all litigants. In a criminal trial, 
fair apportionment may mean more than splitting the close calls; it may require 
sensitivity to the criminal defendant's opportunity to present his case. In both 
situations, the Federal Rules envision the trial judge as umpire or referee, trying 
to keep fair a fast-paced and hotly contested adversary match. Finally, a code 
of general guidelines like the Federal Rules, while permitting an appellate court 
to forgive the occasional trial error, also gives appellate judges some sound 
doctrinal basis for checking whether the trial judge has run an acceptably fair 
trial. ... 
The Policy Of Discretion In The Federal Rules 
Professor Rosenberg has taught us that we should think about judicial dis­
cretion in two senses. In one sense, the focus is on the range of alternatives 
available to the trial judge. If a rule legitimately grants to the trial judge two or 
more alternatives, the trial judge retains decision-liberating discretion. In the 
second sense, the focus is on the appellate court's review power. If the appel­
late court's review power is narrow, the trial court's discretion consequently is 
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great. In Rosenberg's words, when the appellate court is precluded from re­
viewing the trial court, or does so only under an abuse of discretion standard, 
the trial court has been granted" a right to be wrong without incurring reversal." 
Thus, a trial court may have discretion either because a rule provides a range of 
choices or because, although the rule itself seems not to provide alternatives, 
the appellate court's review of the trial court's interpretation is narrow. 
Of course, both senses of discretion--the trial court's decision-liberating 
discretion and the appellate court's review-limiting discretion--vary in degree. 
Some rules on their face may not limit a trial court's discretion in any way. For 
example, Rule 49 ( a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure grants the trial court 
unbridled discretion to require a jury to return, not a general verdict resolving 
liability and fixing damages, but only a special verdict in the form of written an­
swers to specific questions. The Rule provides absolutely no guidance regard­
ing whether and when a trial court should employ special verdicts, and thereby 
implies that a court can employ special verdicts whenever it wants. 
Other rules provide what might be called guided discretion to the trial judge. 
A rule that provides guided discretion grants some flexibility to the judge, but 
restrains the choices by somewhat specific guidelines to which the judge must 
adhere. Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for instance, provides 
that a party usually can amend a pleading only by leave of court, and "leave 
shall be freely granted when justice so requires." One might quarrel with wheth­
er use of the word "justice" provides much, if any, guidance. It is more than 
nothing, however, and although Rule 15's vagueness gives some discretion to 
the trial court, it also affirmatively directs the court generally to allow the parties 
to amend their pleadings. 
Similarly, the standards of appellate review also may vary greatly in the 
amount of discretion afforded the trial court. On purely legal issues, the appel­
late court does not defer at all to the trial court. On issues of fact or mixed law 
and fact, the trial court can afford to be "wrong" as long as it is not clearly erro­
neous or abusive. On a few issues. the appellate court will not review the trial 
court's decision at all. 
On questions of admissibility, the Federal Rules of Evidence--considered 
individually and as jointly applied--provide substantial discretion to trial 
judges. Their generality alone gives trial courts some discretion by creating at 
their fringes a penumbra of debatable meaning. Further, the harmless error rule 
enhances trial court discretion by directing the appellate courts to give the trial 
court a limited right to be wrong without incurring reversal. As following sec­
tions of this Article reveal, the drafters of the Federal Rules infused flexibility into 
trial court decision-making in other ways. Uniformly, however. the court's dis­
cretion is guided. Even the most general rules--the relevancy rule and the un­
fair prejudice rule--provide standards for admissibility. Thus, Chairman Jen­
ner's description of the Federal Rules as providing play in the joints is accurate. 
While the Rules contain a good measure of flexibility, they nonetheless provide 
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principles or guides on which the trial court can rest a ruling--even if, as in Rule 
406, those guidelines sometimes point in different directions. In so doing, the 
Rules guide litigants and trial courts, by infusing some predictability into evi­
dence rulings. The Rules also provide a handle by which appellate courts can 
get a feel for the fairness of the trial. 
In the following discussion, this Article shows that the Advisory Committee 
selected the form of a general code in order to provide a broad measure of dis­
cretion and demonstrates how the drafters implemented this policy in a variety 
of ways. The section therefore buttresses this Article's suggestion that Rule 
406's flexibility might be deliberate and, more generally, that the policy of judi­
cial discretion under the Federal Rules is motivated by wholly different con­
cerns than the Rules' policy in favor of admissibility. 
A Handy Pamphlet: The Rules' Form 
One of the Federal Rules' most striking features is that they encompass 
about two hundred pages--if the Advisory Committee Notes and pertinent leg­
islative history are included--and under forty pages if they are not. What even­
tually took Wigmore nine volumes of text is reduced to what Chairman Jenner 
called a "handy pamphlet." It is equally striking that neither the Advisory Com­
mittee Notes nor the legislative history contains any extensive discussion or de­
bate concerning the Advisory Committee's choice of this general form. Howev­
er, close examination of these materials and two earlier codification 
attempts--the 1942 Model Code of Evidence and the 1953 Uniform Rules of 
Evidence--demonstrates that the Advisory Committee chose the form of a 
general code for the same reasons as the drafters of the Model Code and Uni­
form Rules: to address the proper balance of trial court discretion and appellate 
review . . . .  
A Limited Right to be Wrono 
The harmless error rule underlines the imperfections of the trial as truth pro­
moter. The rule acknowledges that some evidence rulings are inherently diffi­
cult calls, both because evidence rules are imperfect tools and because a trial 
court must make evidence rulings quickly. By making evidentiary errors 
grounds for reversal only if they affect a substantial right of the party, the harm­
less error rule tells losing litigants they have no cause to complain if they were 
able to present the core of their case fairly to the factfinder, without too much 
prejudice poisoning their presentation. 
The rule also speaks to appellate courts by cautioning them to give trial 
courts some right to be wrong, except perhaps for constitutional error. The rule 
urges them to evaluate the strength of the evidence on each side and the trial's 
outcome to determine whether any error may have affected the final judgment. 
This is the appellate court's straightforward task when the trial court has wrong­
ly excluded a litigant's evidence. To determine if the exclusion mattered at trial, 
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the appellate court must evaluate whether the evidence addressed significant 
issues in the case and, assuming the evidence went to an important issue, 
whether other evidence adequately presented the issue to the jury. Similarly, 
when the trial court wrongly has admitted unreliable evidence or reliable evi­
dence that is inadmissible on policy grounds extrinsic to the trial, the appellate 
court must check whether the error affected the final judgment. 
When the alleged error is the trial court's admission of unfairly prejudicial ev­
idence, the appellate court's task is significantly different. The appellate court 
must review the alleged error, other evidence admitted on the same issue, and 
the trial court's other prejudice rulings--to the extent they are present in the 
record. Unfair prejudice cannot be weighed in a vacuum, but requires the ap­
pellate court to look at all of the prejudice injected into the trial by both litigants. 
The appellate court must try to obtain from the cold record some feel for whe­
ther the trial court tried to minimize the prejudice suffered by the complaining 
litigant and sought to apportion the prejudice fairly among the litigants. 
If the trial court made the majority of its prejudice rulings in accordance with 
Rule 403' s balancing formula, rather than under specific exclusionary rules, the 
appellate court's ability to review suffers because of the court's remoteness 
from the heat and fury of trial. In these circumstances, because of the trial 
court's closer perspective, the appellate court frequently is reduced to affirm­
ing the trial court in blind faith. Reversal is typically possible only if the appellate 
court can ascertain that the trial court showed bias by uniformly opening the 
door to prejudice against one of the litigants, without doing the same for the 
other litigant when presented with a similar opportunity. The appellate court in 
other words may be unable to assess the fairness of a single Rule 403 ruling, 
but may be competent to evaluate a handful of them, especially if the trial court 
resolved all or most of them against one side. The Fifth Circuit's decision in H. E. 
Collins v. Wayne Corp. is noteworthy in recognizing this obligation to consider 
the cumulative effect of evidentiary errors. There the court acknowledged that 
"the combination of several errors may require reversal even though each error 
by itself may have been harmless." 
The appellate court may have a better handle if the trial court's rulings allow­
ing the infusion of prejudice or unreliability into the case are based on specific 
exclusionary rules like the character, habit, hearsay, and impeachment rules. 
As noted previously, each of the Federal Rules, though vague at the edges, has 
a core of meaning. To the extent the trial court clearly misreads a specific exclu­
sionary rule· s core of meaning, the trial court has committed error. Under these 
circumstances, the appellate court can reverse if the error by itself is egregious 
in prejudicing the litigant or is one of several such errors indicating that the trial 
court failed to run an acceptably fair trial either through ignorance or bias. The 
appellate court, having identified one clear but not egregious error, can also 
legitimately reverse if it finds that the trial court on all or most of the other close 
prejudice rulings, ruled against the complaining litigant--even if, viewed singly, 
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those rulings could not be regarded as erroneous. Here again, the appellate 
court may be able to determine, from the totality of rulings, that the trial court 
was not fair or evenhanded in overloading one litigant with all the prejudice. 
Each of these scenarios is rare, and they were intended to be rare. They 
jointly convey that the drafters of the Federal Rules envisioned a limited appel­
late role. Only when a trial court commits constitutional error did the drafters 
envision that appellate review might be plenary. These scenarios also jointly 
convey that appellate court rulings are unreliable indicators as to which objec­
tions will prevail on appeal. Because the harmless error rule tells the appellate 
courts to base their decisions on a gestalt view of the overall fairness of each 
trial, appellate evidence decisions usually do not tell third parties what counts 
as reversible error. By its operation, the harmless error rule consequently takes 
some of the ruleness out of the Federal Rules. 
Because the harmless error rule tells appellate courts to look chiefly at 
whether the trial court has run an acceptably fair trial, the principal message to 
trial courts is the same. The notion of harmless error does not mean that trial 
courts have free rein to make evidence rulings capriciously without regard to 
the language of specific rules. But it does convey that on those discretionary 
issues in which a trial court may be within legal boundaries no matter what it 
does, the trial court's chief concern should be whether each litigant has had an 
opportunity to present the core of her case and has borne only her fair share of 
the prejudice that frequently accompanies probative evidence. By so doing, 
the trial court runs a fair trial under the Federal Rules and avoids reversal. 
The Federal Rules' Overall Policy 
This Article has shown that the drafters adopted the middle course in order 
to set the appropriate balance for trial court discretion and appellate review. 
That balance--which overwhelmingly tips in favor of trial courts--is found in a 
variety of places; not only in the Federal Rules' loosely textured style, but also in 
Rule 403's discretionary weighing, the pick-and-choose options provided in a 
few rules, particularly Rule 406, the catchall exception, and the harmless error 
rule. As this Article has shown, the flexibility of the Federal Rules--in all its vari­
ous costumes--provides trial courts with the means to distribute fairly among 
the litigants the close prejudice and reliability decisions. 
The Federal Rules' middle course raises at least three other implications for 
trial court discretion and appellate review. First, the Federal Rules of Evidence 
are intended to provide some guidance to trial courts and litigants, but cannot 
be consulted for the definitive answers to many questions. Jointly the Rules 
lend some predictability to the trial process, probably more so than the com­
mon law of evidence had done. But their predictability quotient is not high. Liti­
gants typically come to court uncertain about the admissibility of at least some 
of their critical evidence. As this Article has shown, a number of factors contrib­
ute to that unpredictability. 
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Second, the drafters intended that the Federal Rules' generality and flexibil­
ity should perpetuate. In part, the drafters' flexibility choice was based on their 
understanding that evidence issues call for quick decision-making. Even if ac­
ceptable, detailed rules could be discovered, the drafters understood that their 
sheer volume would undermine both a trial's efficiency and accuracy. In part 
too, the drafters· choice was based on their belief that each trial is unique and 
calls for discrete resolution. As this Article has shown, the Advisory Committee 
intended to give trial courts the maneuverability to craft its rulings to do individu­
al justice. To that extent, the Committee members were not platonic rational­
ists. The members did not believe there can be ideal evidence rules that trial 
courts can apply mechanically. The Committee was comprised of former and 
practicing trial lawyers who understood the nature of jury trials and believed 
that drafting acceptable specific rules to answer most evidence questions was 
impossible. 
Third, the drafters intended a minor role for appellate courts in deciding evi­
dence questions. The harmless error rule conveys this message most clearly. 
But for its duty to scrutinize closely for constitutional errors, the appellate 
court's proper role under the Federal Rules is limited to checking the trial's 
overall fairness. The Rules seek to accomplish that purpose by marking a few 
bright lines by which appellate courts can gauge the trial's fairness, and by en­
couraging reversal only when the appellate court is convinced that the eviden­
tiary errors, considered collectively, have affected the outcome of trial. Further, 
the drafters did not intend for the appellate courts to become rulemakers them­
selves by establishing binding precedents that narrow or focus the Federal 
Rules' general language. Appellate fine-tuning of the Federal Rules is incon­
sistent with the drafters' purpose.lt undermines the loosely textured style of the 
Rules and the trial court's flexibility afforded by that lack of rigidity. Additionally, 
taken to its extreme, appellate narrowing undermines the "Handy-pamphlet" 
notion and creates an elaborate and unworkable common law of evidence. Fi­
nally, appellate fine-tuning bespeaks a rationalism about the trial process not 
shared by the drafters who believed a fair but imperfect trial was all that was 
possible. Thus, appellate judges who see their function under the Federal 
Rules as equivalent to their interpretive, gap-filling function under substantive 
statutory schemes are mistaken. 
A Defense Of Th e Federal Rules' Policy 
The only viable alternative to the Federal Rules' middle course is a more de­
tailed code that restricts trial court discretion by containing specific answers to 
all or almost all evidence questions. We have grown either too wise or too dis­
trustful to place unfettered discretion in trial judges. Thus, Charles Clark's pro­
posal of a creed, if seriously considered in 1940, deserves no consideration 
less that fifty years later. 
Like the Advisory Committee, we probably also are too wise to consider 
even attempting a more detailed evidence code like the one supported by 
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Dean Wigmore. Foremost among the reasons is the impossibility of the task. 
Given the enormous variety of possible evidentiary situations, drafting a code 
addressing even most evidence issues is probably impossible. Moreover, ad­
dressing only most of the issues would be insufficient. If the goals are to pro­
vide mechanical answers to evidence questions and to reduce trial court dis­
cretion, a code claiming to be complete, but in reality falling short of 
completeness, would succeed only partly on both scores. Arguably, such a 
code would create a greater evil by providing absolutely no guidance to the trial 
court on the unanswered questions. Thus, the project itself is a chimera. For 
that reason alone, the Advisory Committee's choice of a loosely textured code 
seems a wise one. Even assuming, however--against our best intuitions--the 
theoretical possibility of a closed and complete evidence code, it is far from ob­
vious that such a code would be more effective than the Federal Rules in pro­
moting the pertinent values of truth promotion, predictability, or fairness. The 
following sections examine the extent to which a loosely textured code effec­
tively promoted these values. 
Truth Promotion 
Looking back at the historical experience of the common law's categorical 
exclusionary rules, the drafters of the Federal Rules had no reason to accept 
the empirical claim that detailed evidence rules promote the truth more effec­
tively than flexible, loosely textured rules. Less than fifteen years later, there is 
no good reason to question the drafters' judgment. As a general matter, rules 
allowing room for a trial judge's sensitivity to the complexity and uniqueness of 
a particular case necessarily should promote truth more than rules providing 
for only mechanical application of a closed and complete system. Mechanical 
rules restrain a trial judge's access to factors that might lead to the best resolu­
tion of a particular case. This general maxim about the dangers of formalism is 
particularly true for evidence law. Most, though not all, evidence issues raise 
concerns either about the reliability of an item of evidence or about its probative 
value balanced against its prejudicial effect. This inquiry is necessarily trial spe­
cific. No closed and complete system can promote truth as well as rules that 
allow judges to consider all the legal issues and factual evidence, the unique 
emotional aura of the trial, the jurors' intelligence, and the peculiar identities of 
the parties, who frequently bring to court the prejudicial baggage of their lives. 
No closed and complete system can accommodate a trial judge's cumulative 
assessment of the total prejudice injected into a particular trial against one or 
both litigants. 
The foregoing discussion assumes that excellent judges, wisely sensitive to 
the complexity of a case and capable of considering its features, are making 
the evidence calls. But even if one assumes instead that mediocre judges are 
applying an evidence code, the outcome is not obviously different. No empiri­
cal evidence exists to suggest that a mediocre judge does better under a 
closed and complete system of rules than under one allowing some discretion-
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ary weighing. It is hard to know how to assess this question without any empiri­
cal evidence, in part because of the difficulty of imagining how detailed a code 
would have to be in order to be closed and complete. But given the enormous 
variety of evidence issues, one reasonably can assume that even a code that 
restricted a trial court's discretion only substantially, not entirely, would contain 
hundreds of rules. On that assumption, we can consider some obvious prob­
lems with an enormously detailed code. 
One problem is that mediocre judges could make at least as many errors 
interpreting specific language as they would applying loosely textured lan­
guage. Another problem is that mediocre judges also commit errors of mis­
application; sometimes, because sophisticated lawyers lead them astray by in­
tentionally mispackaging an offer of evidence, judges apply the wrong rule. 
The more detailed the code, the more opportunities there will be for attorney 
mislabeling, thereby making judicial misinterpretation and misapplication er­
rors more likely. Thus, it is not clear that a closed and complete evidence code 
promotes the truth better than a loosely-textured code--even with mediocre 
judges. 
One might object, however, on grounds that the discretionary balancing 
which the Federal Rules frequently require is often guesswork; there is no rea­
son to think that trial judges, whatever their intellectual capacities, ever can bal­
ance accurately the probative value of one item of evidence against its prejudi­
cial effects, much less weigh and apportion fairly a number of items. Indeed, 
one empirical study has claimed that judges, as well as lawyers and jurors, 
have widely disparate views about what constitutes prejudicial evidence. Thus, 
the argument goes, because we have so little confidence in judges' abilities to 
engage in this kind of balancing, mechanical rules setting the balance, howev­
er imperfectly, are preferable to discretionary rules. 
Even assuming, however, that sometimes different people balance differ­
ently, the nihilistic claims advanced above prove too much. The same con­
cerns over whether individual judges can balance accurately also necessarily 
question whether a small group of rulemakers could frame acceptable rules. If 
the empirical studies suggest that no one can agree on prejudice, as between a 
judge who misbalances and a rule that does the same, we are left with no good 
choice. More importantly, however, there is no reason to accept this nihilistic 
perspective. Balancing is not so unfathomable. Balancing probativeness 
against prejudice is about fairness and evenhandedness. If we are that dubious 
about judges' intellectual capacities to be fair, we need to rethink our entire ju­
risprudence, not just our rules of evidence. 
Thus, those who argue for more detail in the Federal Rules cannot justify 
their proposals on grounds that a more detailed code necessarily fosters great­
er accuracy. Proponents for more detail must argue that a closed and complete 
code enhances other values--chiefly, increased predictability and greater fair­
ness at the trial court level through enhanced appellate review. But a detailed 
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evidence code fails as a panacea for the uncertainties of trial or the dangers of 
an evil trial judge. 
Predictability 
Some predictability necessarily flows from a code of rules that is both acces­
sible and uniform. By being understandable to litigants, as well as to courts, 
and by providing that courts should treat similar instances in a similar way, such 
a code allows parties to know ahead of time how a trial court will decide their 
cases. The importance of predictability in the law should be obvious. In sub­
stantive areas, for example, in order to decide whether to enter into a transac­
tion or engage in certain behavior, people need to know beforehand the conse­
quences of their actions, including the legal consequences of those actions. 
Some commentators believe that strong predictability in evidence law is also 
important. Indeed, as noted previously, the alleged unpredictability of Mor­
gan's 1942 Model Code was principal cause of Wigmore's dissenting vote. 
Settlement Promotion 
One might regard the primary value of predictability in evidence rules to be 
its capacity to promote settlement. Litigants, civil or criminal, need to under­
stand the trial process ahead of time in order to decide whether to litigate. The 
decision to litigate or to settle is based in part on the likelihood of prevailing at 
trial. If the parties are uncertain about the probable outcome of litigation, they 
will be less likely to settle. 
The Federal Rules of Evidence are not without some predictive value. Liti­
gants, for example, know ahead of trial that all relevant evidence generally will 
be admissible, and that prejudicial material generally will be excluded only if its 
prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value. Litigants also 
know the core meaning of some of the specific Federal Rules. The drafters 
marked some bright lines. But this Article has demonstrated that on many of 
the close prejudice or reliability rulings, the trial court has wide discretion to ad­
mit or exclude. The effect of this discretion is that sometimes a litigant cannot 
reasonably surmise ahead of trial whether the trial court will admit or exclude 
the evidence. A reasonable question to ask is whether the Federal Rules' un­
predictability matters, and if so, whether a detailed code might enhance pre­
dictability. 
The answer to both these questions is probably not. First, the unpredictabil­
ity of the Federal Rules of Evidence arguably does not inhibit settlement in more 
than a de minimis degree. The presence of a variety of factors more significant­
ly contributes to a litigant's uncertainties about the outcome of trial. Disputes 
over the legal issues in the case and their resolution under the substantive law, 
disagreement among the parties about the real facts of the case, and uncer­
tainty about the idiosyncrasies of the factfinders contribute more substantially 
to the unpredictability of trial than the uncertainties associated with federal evi-
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dence law. Moreover, some commentators have shown that a little uncertainty 
about the likely result of litigation actually may induce parties to settle. Thus, 
even assuming that the vagueness of the Federal Rules contributes to the un­
certainties of trial, it is an open question whether that degree of uncertainty ac­
tually inhibits settlement. Finally, given that the vast majority of cases settle 
without going to trial and that this figure has remained constant over time, our 
society appears not to be deterred from settling due the flexibility of the Federal 
Rules. 
Second, even assuming that the unpredictability of the Federal Rules does 
inhibit settlement to some extent, a detailed evidence code may not foster 
settlement any more effectively. As previously noted, a detailed code would be 
many times longer than the Federal Rules. A code so elaborate might make it 
difficult for litigants and courts to identify certain items of evidence as instances 
of a given rule, and it would provide lawyers with opportunities to mispackage 
certain evidence in the guise of something else. The effect of greater detail, giv­
en the haste with which a trial court must make an evidence ruling, would be 
more interpretive error. Further, assuming that the goal of the trial process un­
der the detailed code would still be a fair trial, not a perfect trial, appellate courts 
would be required either to overlook a technical misinterpretation or to forgive it 
under a harmless error standard. Under a detailed code then, predictability 
would be undermined by frequent trial court errors--at least more frequent 
than a flexible code like the Federal Rules--and by the appellate court's for­
giveness of trial court errors. Even assuming that greater predictability in evi­
dence might enhance settlement, it is not intuitively obvious that a detailed evi­
dence code would increase the amount of predictability in the trial process 
substantially more than the Federal Rules. 
Efficient Adjudication 
One might argue that a second reason for predictability in evidence rules is 
to promote pretrial adjudication. Greater detail in rules might allow trial courts 
to resolve more cases at the summary judgment stage. Because the trial court 
could assess more easily what evidence would count at trial, it could more easi­
ly decide whether any material facts would be in dispute. 
But the efficiencies are doubtful here because of the number of cases in 
which the evidence admissible at trial does not raise a material fact dispute. 
Moreover, encouraging the trial court routinely to make preliminary evidentiary 
rulings at the summary judgment stage will cut significantly into the court's lim­
ited time. Most likely the trial court's total expenditure of time spent making evi­
dence rulings on unsuccessful summary judgments would be excessive. Any 
efficiencies gained by promoting pretrial adjudication would be offset at least, 
and probably outweighed, by fruitless rulings on unsuccessful summary judg­
ment motions. 
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Additionally, it could be argued that detailed rules might reduce trial time by 
reducing the number of evidentiary objections. The assumption here would be 
that if evidence rules speak to all possible contingencies. there should be fewer 
objections. But fewer objections will result only if the rules are clear and acces­
sible. Because, as noted, a closed and complete evidence code would be volu­
minous. the misapplication opportunities would be great. Our collective experi­
ence should persuade us that good lawyers will find ample litigation 
opportunities with detailed, as well as with general, codification. 
fairness in the Trial Court 
Behind some of the demands for detailed procedural rules and less trial 
court discretion is the specter of an evil genius, the biased to unprincipled trial 
judge. The pat, but nonetheless sound, response to these demands is that pro­
cedural rules should not be drafted with the most incompetent or evil judge in 
mind. Rulemaking is about ordering society in the best way possible. Even if 
rulemaking is not grounded entirely on hope for a better way, it proceeds, as it 
should, on the assumption that people charged with implementing the rules 
will do so in a responsible way. Moreover, no evidence rules can impede a trial 
judge bent on mistreating a litigant. Particularly in the context of an ongoing 
trial, a biased judge can abuse a litigant in a variety of subtle and largely unre­
viewable ways. The judge's demeanor, tone of voice, and facial expressions 
toward the party and the jury, as well as toward the party's counsel and wit­
nesses, can poison that person in the jurors' minds. A trial judge also can mis­
treat a litigant by intentionally reaching erroneous rulings. Indeed, a federal dis­
trict court is not harmed in any way by the occasional reversal. The losing 
litigant, however, is forced to undertake a costly appeal and second trial, often 
before the same judge. No rules, however detailed, can prevent unethical trial 
judges from treating litigants unfairly. 
This does not mean that our procedural rules should place blind faith in trial 
judges; nor do they. Indeed, as the Federal Rules of Evidence themselves pro­
vide, rules should contain detail sufficient to enable reviewing courts to evalu­
ate whether litigants have received a fair shake. By containing some specific 
rules and by allowing appellate courts, in accordance with the harmless error 
rule, to evaluate the effect of all errors on the trial's outcome, the Federal Rules 
seek to ensure that litigants will not suffer either from a trial court's ignorance or 
from its bias. Although the appellate courts cannot always prevent the evil jurist 
from mistreating a litigant, they should be able to reverse the trial court's mis­
conduct to the extent it is on the record. The premise of the Federal Rules is that 
there is enough specificity to allow appellate courts to evaluate whether the trial 
court has run an acceptably fair trial. 
No more should be expected of an evidence code. Some might quibble with 
whether the federal Rules provide enough detail to allow appellate courts to 
evaluate a trial's fairness. But the absence of any loud roar from the litigation 
Preliminary Perspectives on Judicial Discretion 29 
community suggests that the Federal Rules of Evidence generally promote a 
fair, but perhaps not perfect, trial. 
The Wisdom of the Drafters· Choices 
Defending an existing code, warts and all, against an alternative, unrealized 
dream is speculative at best. [This article] has attempted to do so by question­
ing the theoretical possibility of the alternative and by showing that the pur­
ported advantages in having a more detailed evidence code are not intuitively 
obvious. The burden, of course, is on the proponents of more systematic de­
tail. We have little reason to believe that a closed and complete code is even 
possible. Nor do we have any reason to believe that such a code, even if possi­
ble, would be more likely to promote settlement or enhance a trial's search for 
an accurate, efficient, and fair outcome. Until proponents of more precision 
and less trial court discretion demonstrate their value, we should feel comfort­
able that the Advisory Committee made a sound choice in opting for a flexible, 
middle course. 
Conclusion 
Sometimes trial judges appear to distribute the close prejudice and reliabil­
ity rulings fairly among the parties. This Article has attempted to show that when 
a trial court balances its rulings to ensure that both litigants have had an oppor­
tunity to present their cases fairly, it acts in accordance with the intent of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence. For above all, the Federal Rules intended to give 
trial judges considerable leeway in making evidentiary decisions. 
Sometimes appellate judges appear to give relatively short shrift to evi­
dence issues, by finding no error in summary fashion or by forgiving a trial 
court's error as harmless. When the appellate court paints with this conclusory 
brush from a belief that the trial court has run an acceptably fair trial, the appel­
late court adopts its proper role. Indeed, the appellate court's typical brief di­
gression from the substantive issues in the case rightly conveys to trial courts 
and litigants thatthe Federal Rules of Evidence are a flexible guide of principles, 
not a code etched in granite. 
